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Abstract—In Man-At-The-End (MATE) attacks, software apps
run on a device under full control of the attackers: they can
violate the intellectual property of the app by means of malicious
reverse engineering, software piracy, and software tampering.
Obfuscation is a technique that is widely adopted by developers
to mitigate this problem. Obfuscation increases complexity of
software code, by obscuring the structure of code and data
in order to thwart the reverse engineering process. However,
it is possible to reverse engineer obfuscated code with time,
determination and the right tools. In general, there is no accepted
methodology to determine the strength of obfuscated code;
however resilience is often considered a good metric as it indicates
the percentage of obfuscated code that cannot be removed by
automated de-obfuscation tools. We introduce a novel approach
to measure the resilience of obfuscated C code using program
slicing. Given a variable of interest, that might be part of a code
region used to manipulate a crypto key or a license number,
program slicing can mimic the attacker behaviour by trying to
remove the code unrelated to that variable, acting as a new type
of de-obfuscator.
Index Terms—Program slicing, Code obfuscation, ORBS, re-
verse engineering, resilience, de-obfuscation, software security,
MATE attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
The latest BSA Global Software Survey on Software
Piracy [1] states 37% of software installed on computers
around the world in 2017 are not appropriately licensed,
amounting to $46 billion in losses. When software apps run on
a device under full control of the attackers they can be victims
of software piracy, usually achieved through Man-At-The-End
(MATE) attacks [2], where attackers use reverse engineering
tools to analyse and modify the code to use it in unauthorised
ways: e.g. removing license checks or illegally duplicating
copyrighted material. Code Obfuscation is a technique that
is widely adopted by developers to mitigate this problem by
increasing the complexity of the code, in order to thwart the
reverse engineering process .
For more than a decade, security and compiler optimisation
researchers have proposed various techniques of code obfus-
cation [3] to prevent code from being analysed, and tamper-
prooﬁng [4] to detect the execution of tampered code; other
techniques like software watermarking [5], ﬁngerprinting [6]
have been developed to bind authorship to the code so that
violations could be used as evidence in legal courts. The
software industry and large companies like Google [7],
Microsoft and Intel [8] have also invested signiﬁcantly in
these technologies. However, secrets kept hidden within code
will eventually be discovered by a sufﬁciently resourced and
determined hacker. Researchers aim to stop the majority of
hackers and to slow down the more expert ones to a point in
which an attack would be no longer useful.
Code Obfuscation preserves the original functionality of a
program while adding redundant information to the code in
order to make it unintelligible for humans, and to slow down
or crash automated program comprehension tools so that the
result of program analysis is wrong or incomplete [9]. There
is currently no agreement on the methodology to determine
which obfuscation technique provides the best possible soft-
ware protection. One of the more recent metrics used to assess
the effectiveness of obfuscation is the concept of resilience,
deﬁned as the percentage of obfuscated code that cannot be
removed by automated de-obfuscation tools, and it clearly
depends by the type of tool and the target language, e.g.:
interpreted or compiled code, bytecode or native code. In this
paper, we present a novel approach to determine the resilience
of native code (generated from C language) using program
slicing. Mark Weiser introduced program slicing with a view
to understanding behaviour of a program’s constructs [10].
The technique was built based on how programmers debug
their programs by looking at subsets of the program that are
of interest; for example, where a variable is printing incorrect
results. This is very similar to what an attacker is trying to
do when attempting to reverse engineer a piece of software,
and then we propose to apply program slicing to estimate the
resilience of software obfuscation. In the rest of the paper,
Section II provides background to the problem in terms of
code obfuscation and introduces program slicing. Section III,
presents the methodology and toolchain. Section IV describes
the experimental setup and Section V presents results from
the study. Section VI discusses related works and section VII
presents experimental data. Finally, Section VIII provides a
summary of the current work and ideas for future research.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Code Obfuscation
Code obfuscation is the most viable method for preventing
reverse-engineering [11]: the goal is to make the code difﬁcult
to understand by using a software tool called obfuscator, a
special compiler that can perform binary-to-binary, source-
to-binary or source-to-source code transformations. As we
aim to determine resilience of the code generated by the
obfuscator, we have chosen source-to-source code obfuscation
to have more control on the compiler options, and monitor
code changes through our experiments, while in source-to-
binary and binary-to-binary obfuscators many decisions made
by the tool are neither visible nor conﬁgurable.
Lexical transformations, Control ﬂow transformations, Data
transformations, Anti-disassembly, Anti-debugging, and En-
cryption are the types of obfuscation that are commonly
used by obfuscators [5], offered by companies like Semantic
Designs [12], Irdeto [13], and Stunnix [14], while Tigress [15]
is a well-known open source obfuscator with different kinds of
protection techniques and is widely used for research. Tigress
supports three advanced types of transformations:
• Virtualization – transforms a function into an interpreter
• Jitting – transforms a function into one that generates its
machine code at runtime.
• JitDynamic – transforms a function into one that contin-
uously modiﬁes its machine code at runtime.
In addition to these, Tigress implements other common
obfuscation transformations, such as: Control ﬂow ﬂattening,
Function splitting, Function merging, Argument randomiza-
tion, Control ﬂow splitting with opaque predicates, Encoding
of literals, and, Data and arithmetic transformation. For the
experiments in this paper, we employ Virtualization along with
Control-ﬂow ﬂattening and Function splitting as they are com-
plex and commonly used obfuscation transformations. Each
of these transformations has a certain number of parameters
which are used to create many obfuscated code variants.
B. Program Slicing
Program slicing is the computation of a set of programs
statements, that may affect the value of a variable at some
point of interest [16]. It is a decomposition technique that
extracts statements relevant to a particular computation from
a program [17]. A slice could be regarded as the mental
abstraction people make when they are debugging a program.
A slice consists of all the statements of a program that may
affect the values of some variables at some point of interest
referred to as a slicing criterion [10].
A slice is computed using either static information (without
program execution) known as a static slice, or dynamic infor-
mation (execution of a program) known as a dynamic slice.
Static slicing seeks to ﬁnd an executable subset of a program's
statement that exhibits the same behaviour of a speciﬁed
variable at a speciﬁc location as the original program for all
possible inputs. On the other hand, dynamic slice preserves
the behaviour of slicing criterion only with respect to speciﬁc
input [18].
Observation based slicing was recently introduced by re-
searchers as an alternative to dependence-based program slic-
ing. Observation based slicing (ORBS) [18] uses a delete–
execute–observe approach where a statement is deleted, then
the program is executed and an observation is made on whether
the projected trajectory of the slicing criterion is changed. If
no changes are observed, the deleted statement is excluded
from the slices. Conversely, if a change is observed, the deleted
statement is included in the slice. This process is iterated until
no further statements can be excluded from the slice. ORBS
was introduced with a view to slice heterogeneous programs
consisting of components written in different programming
language and perform slicing that includes binary components
or external libraries. ORBS is designed to reduce the length
of a program to an abstract subset requiring less human
effort to understand the program. Our approach uses ORBS
to determine the resilience of obfuscated code.
III. METHODOLOGY AND TOOLCHAIN
In this section, we described the methodology and our
Toolchain for the experimentation. Our current Toolchain
integrates Tigress as obfuscator and ORBS frameworks into
an automated Toolchain that can create multiple obfuscated
variants of a target program, and generate the program slices
for both the original target program and its obfuscated variants.
The approach can be adopted with any source-code to source-
code obfuscator and different programming languages (instead
of C language used by Tigress) as ORBS frameworks is
programming language independent. Comparison of the slices
from these data points help us to determine and understand the
effectiveness of obfuscation techniques used to produce each
variant.
Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of our
Toolchain, which executes as a process made of different
phases, as depicted in the diagram. In the beginning (Stage 1)
the original target program (Program P1) is instrumented to
mark the slicing criteria - that is, the points of interest, so that
ORBS slicer is able to subsequently extract dependencies for
these points. We selected a point of interest from each program
to indicate a key functionality that software vendors may
want to protect from Man-At-The-End (MATE) attack. This
scenario is similar to the approach where an attacker tries to
reverse engineer the code to identify a piece of code containing
sensitive information. It focuses on a piece of code that may
be of interest and identiﬁes all the associated code constructs.
The slice of the original target program from this stage is
later used as ground truth to understand the effectiveness of
the obfuscation.
The next stage involves using Tigress to produce several
obfuscated variants of the original program. We have generated
multiple variants of the same target program by running
Tigress with different combinations of parameters. These vari-
ants are marked as P1 V1 to P1 Vn, where n is the number of
variants created. The number of versions generated for every
target program may not be the same as some combinations
of parameters do not form a valid conﬁguration for Tigress
or they might not work for a particular program structure.
Obfuscated code size is typically bigger than the original code,
because of the additional bogus code included to hide the
actual functionality and to make it more difﬁcult to read and
understand the program.
In the third stage, the toolchain mimics what an attacker
would do once identiﬁed a point of interest in the code: ﬁnd
Fig. 1. Obfuscation resilience checker Toolchain.
out the parts related to the point of interest and reduce the
amount of code that the attacker needs to analyse. We use
ORBS to slice the variant, to reduce the number of lines that
the attacker would need to study for the same points of interest
as in the original program. These are marked as P1 V1 S
to P1 Vn S, where n is the number of variants generated in
the obfuscation phase. Our conjecture is that the resilience
of obfuscation and its quality is correlated to the amount of
code that needs to be manually inspected by the attacker to
understand the program. Therefore, the more successful ORBS
is at reducing the program (the smaller the slice) the easier it
would be for the attacker to read and understand the code.
Finally, the results are analysed for each different obfuscated
variant of the program and compared to the original to
determine which Tigress transformation performs better than
others. The approach presented in this paper therefore is a
framework that not only helps identify which of the obfuscated
variants from a set is more resilient, but that can be later
extended to identify which of the conﬁguration parameters of
the obfuscator will produce the best results.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Program Selection
In order to conduct the experiment, we selected 8 open
source C programs that are widely used in program slicing.
The programs have different size, structure and functionality
to ensure that we cover programs with different properties.
Table I gives information about the program sizes in terms
of Lines of Code (LoC), functionality and the slicing variable
used in our experiments.
B. Transformation Selectors
The Tigress tool has a number of parameters: out of the
several code transformation options, we selected Virtualiza-
tion, Control ﬂow ﬂattening and Function splitting which are
the most advanced offered by the tool.
TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS
Slice Criteria
Program Functionality Lines Variable(s)
P1 Month Calculator 45 month_days, mnames
P2 Delta Square Root 54 i
P3 Simpliﬁed Fibonacci 35 n, s
P4 Name number generator 173 counter
P5 Fibonacci (extended) 84 n, result
P6 Sequence generator 127 n, result
P7 Simple calculator 51 summation
P8 Resource allocator 40 i
Based on these transformations and their parameters, we
were able to generate from 8 to 15 variants for each of
the open-source programs included in the experiment. It is
important to note that some combinations of parameter values
do not produce valid conﬁgurations due to some conﬂicts
among the obfuscator parameters; sometimes Tigress is able
to detect this invalid conﬁgurations by stopping the build
process and reporting errors, while in other cases the build
process ﬁnishes but the code built might not be executable.
The Tigress transformation parameters and their options used
in this study are listed in Table II. It should be noted that the
seed parameter that selects a random transformation has been
set to 0 to exclude any randomness in code generation from
our experiments as we could not track the correspondence
between a particular seed value and the set of generated
transformations. Moreover, we did not consider switch,
indirect and call parameter values of the Control-ﬂow
ﬂattening transformations, because of its similarity with the
Virtualization transformation, and also because we noticed that
often such combinations did not build a valid C ﬁle, due to
the conﬂicts between these two types of transformations.
The three transformation parameters used could take a total
of 20 values, resulting in almost 200 possible combinations.
Some of these combinations worked for some programs and
not for others, thus we were able to generate 48 combinations
that worked across the various programs; we generated 8 to 15
obfuscated versions for each of the programs: this ultimately
resulted in a total of 90 obfuscated variants overall for the 8
subject programs.
C. Orbs Conﬁguration Selection
Finally, the relevant conﬁgurations for the ORBS slicers
is given in Table III. We do not discuss the parameters in
detail as ORBS is deterministic and we used the parameters
consistently throughout the experiments. There are further
ORBS parameters that could be set, but only the minimal
compulsory set was used.
Each experiment subject provides multiple variables that
produce output: an attacker might be interested in one or more
of these variables. Column 4 of Table I shows the slicing
criteria that we selected for each subject programs. One key
point to note is that, in order for the ORBS tool to perform
slicing, we had to instrument the source code with ORBS
TABLE II
TIGRESS PARAMETERS
Transformation and option name and description Parameter Description
Virtualization (VirtualizeDispatch) - Turn a
function into a specialized interpreter.
switch dispatch by while()switch(next)...
direct dispatch by direct threading
indirect dispatch by indirect threading
call dispatch by call threading
ifnest dispatch by nested if-statements
linear dispatch by searching a table using linear search
binary dispatch by searching a table using binary search
interpolation dispatch by searching a table using interpolation search
? Pick a random dispatch method(not used)
Control-ﬂow Flattening (FlattenDispatch)
Remove control ﬂow from a function.
(switch, indirect, call) generates error and
* is randomly selected.
switch dispatch by while(1) switch (next) blocks
goto dispatch by labl1: block1; goto block2;
indirect dispatch by goto* (jtab[next])
call each block is outlined into its own function
* select a dispatch method at random.(not used)
Function splitting (SplitKinds) - Split a
function into smaller parts.
top split the top-level list of statements into functions
block split a basic block (list of assignment and call statements) into two functions.
deep split out a nested control structure of at least height> 2 into its own function
recursive same as block, but calls to split functions are also allowed to be split out.
level split out a statement at a level speciﬁed by –SplitLevel.
inside split out a statement at the innermost nesting level.
TABLE III
ORBS CONFIGURATION PROPERTIES
Name of the property Value
Slicing window size 4
Slicing direction backward
keyword to capture the trajectory for the slicing criteria; the
instrumentation process does not impact the functionality or
semantics of the program.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this experiment the Toolchain has computed 90 variants
of 8 programs to determine the resilience of the obfuscated
code generated by Tigress. The Toolchain computes both the
increased number of lines after obfuscation and the redundant
code removed by ORBS: the actual lines of code left after
ORBS processing indicate the resilience of the obfuscation.
Figure 2 graphically represents the results of the increase in
the program sizes after the transformation. We can see that
depending on each transformation parameter, program size
varies widely across different variants.
For example, there are programs with initial size of 50
LoC which have increased to over 2000 lines for a given
set of parameters, whereas some have only increased to 500
for the same set of parameters. However, if it is possible for
an attacker to use automated tools to remove the amount of
inﬂation in lines and reverse it back to nearly the original
size, the effectiveness of the obfuscation transformation can
be considered questionable.
Our conjecture is that executing ORBS using slicing criteria
for a program will determine the least number of lines that
a MATE attacker needs to look at and understand in order
to reverse engineer. Lines that ORBS is not able to remove
Fig. 2. Program expansion using Tigress obfuscation.
from each variant represent the least number of lines that are
required to understand the behaviour of the particular point of
interest.
Table IV shows how much of the original program can be
removed by ORBS before applying any obfuscation. Column 2
reports the number of lines in the original program, column 3
reports the number of lines that were deleted, and columns
4 and 5 reporting the number of lines remaining and the
percentage of lines removed, respectively. Column 4 therefore
shows the least number of lines required to execute the
program while producing the same results for the selected
slicing criterion. From Table IV, it can be seen that ORBS
was successful at removing a minimum of 45% of the program
code (P8) leaving a potential attacker with 55% of the code to
study. On the other hand, ORBS succeeded at removing 95%
of code (P4), in which case an attacker would be left with
only 5% of code to analyse.
The graph in Figure 3 summarises 90 variants of 8 programs
and represents the resilience of obfuscated code by removing
redundant code using the developed tool-chain. The black line
represents removal of redundant code using ORBS, while the
grey line represents the resilience of obfuscated code, i.e. the
percentage of obfuscated code that could not be removed by
ORBS.
The resilience in Figure 3 reads from left to right; where
left side of the graph represents higher resilience than of the
right. The graph clearly shows obfuscated code for P8 V27
(Program 8 - version 27), has much higher resilience than
P4 V16 (Program 4 - version 16). For example, initially
P8 had 40 LoC which was increased to 950 LoC and only
130 LoC were removed by ORBS. The Tigress combination
ifnest, goto and recursive was used to generate this
variant which provides 86% resilience.
Table V presents data for the highest resilience achieved
by the variants of each program. Looking at the resilience
(Table V) for each transformation, it is not evident that
any particular set or combination parameters outperforms the
others. Therefore, the current set of results seem to show
that the structure of the program also signiﬁcantly inﬂuences
the resilience resultant from the application of particular
parameters. For instance, P1 initially had 45 lines of code, this
was increased by 2216% lines of code with the Tigress param-
eter interpolation goto recursive, with the coding
exhibiting a resilience of 60%. On the other hand, Tigress com-
bination parameter ifnest goto top produced resilience
of 67% with code inﬂation of 1951%. Therefore, we can
argue that although combination interpolation goto
recursive produced maximum increase in the number of
lines, ifnest goto top still provides higher resilience
from attack.
Although there is no clear trend, looking at the ranked
results, the combination ifnest goto deep produced the
highest resilience at 86% for P8 V27 by removing only 14%
of redundant code. We found that increased number of lines
did not necessarily increases the resilience of obfuscated code.
Future work will further look into details of correlations
between applied transformation parameters, programming con-
structs (loops, branches etc.) and the identiﬁed resilience.
Furthermore, from Table V, it can be seen that the transfor-
mation for P8 was highly resilient when compared to P4. The
data for P8 actually mimics the results published in Table IV.
For program P8, ORBS obtained a reduction of only 45%
when slicing the original program and variants of the same
program also exhibits highest resilience at 86%. Similarly, for
program P4 whose variants have the lowest resilience, ORBS
produced the smallest relative slice at 95% reduction of the
program. Although the data for the best and worst performers
map to each other, the mapping does not hold for the programs
that lie in the middle of the range.
A. Threats to Validity
There are several threats to validity that we have identiﬁed.
These include the selection of programs and whether they
represent real-world systems. We also acknowledge that all
possible combinations of Tigress parameters have not been
explored in this paper. The combinations of parameter values
for Tigress were randomly generated out of a set of valid
values but all variants had to be compiled and run to check if
they were working. In some cases this resulted in variations to
be produced correctly for a certain set of programs but failing
for others; making the comparison unbalanced. We expect to
be able to address all such and additional threats to validity
in a future extended empirical study.
VI. RELATED WORK
There are a number of commercial and non-commercial
tools like IDA, GDB, Ghidra, Radare2, OllyDbg, Valgrind,
and the Angr framework that have been demonstrated as
effective for the purpose of reverse engineering [19]. Static
analysis and dynamic analysis are the key choice of program
analysis that are used for reverse engineering [20]. Shimba
is a tool where static information is extracted from bytecode
and dynamic events are traced automatically from selected
control ﬂow objects [20]. In contrast, Udupa et al proposed a
dynamic analysis approach to enhance the reverse engineering
process [21]. In their experiment they have used artiﬁcial
blocks of code into two different functions: only one is
executed while the other is a decoy that can be spot with
control-ﬂow analysis.
Different metrics are used to measure various security
requirements [22], and similarly code metrics have also been
a common approach to measure obfuscation strength [23] or
by calculating their potency [3]. Other approaches have been
proposed to measure the attacker effort increased by obfusca-
tion by means of controlled experiments with students [23],
penetration testers [24] or public challenges [25], while other
works tried to represent the attacker effort with modelling
approaches based on Petri nets [26] [27], or an ontology of
attacks and protections [28].
Yadegari et al. showed how to undo complex obfuscation
techniques [29] by noticing that weak protections only inject
bogus code with invariant behaviour that can be identiﬁed
more easily. Liu et al. used resilience as optimisation function
to search for the best obfuscation in 20 popular Javascript
projects [30]. None of these techniques consider program slic-
ing as an effective approach to reverse engineer. Sebastian et
al. proposed to characterise the resilience of code obfuscation,
transformations against automated symbolic execution [31].
Subsequently further work has also been proposed to improve
this ability by using a combination of ﬁne-grained bit-level
taint analysis and architecture-aware constraint generations
[32]. Scrinzi et al. extracted semantic information and be-
haviour of the execution for de-obfuscation [33]. They argued
that there are some characteristics of the execution that are
strictly correlated with the underlying logic of the code which
are invariant after applying obfuscation. The search for the
TABLE IV
TARGET PROGRAMS AND LINES OF CODE REQUIRED TO EXECUTE
Program Number of Lines Lines deleted Lines remaining % of lines removed
P1 45 29 16 64%
P2 54 29 25 54%
P3 35 23 12 66%
P4 173 164 9 95%
P5 84 64 20 76%
P6 127 107 20 84%
P7 51 33 18 65%
P8 40 18 22 45%
Fig. 3. Redundant code removed by ORBS to determine resilience of Tigress obfuscation.
TABLE V
HIGHEST RESILIENCE
Program Tigress Combination Resilience%
P1 ifnest goto top 67%
P2 interpolation goto block 66%
P3 indirect goto deep 46%
P4 ifnest goto deep 25%
P5 call goto top 54%
P6 interpolation goto top 42%
P7 call goto top 70%
P8 ifnest goto deep 86%
optimal obfuscation conﬁguration has been done by Ceccato
et al. [34] in case of software diversity but using static metrics.
To the best of our knowledge we are the ﬁrst to propose slice
size as a measure of resilience: our approach mimics the use
of debugging by actual attackers and aims to automate the
resilience measurement.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL DATA
Full set of our experimental data and results available at
http://syedislam.com/obfuscation.
VIII. SUMMARY
In this paper we introduced a novel approach to compute ob-
fuscation resilience using program slicing. Our main goal was
to determine which obfuscated variant of a program provides
highest protection against MATE attacks. In general, larger
obfuscated code may be perceived as harder to understand
and reverse engineer, but we showed that this is not always
the case, when the attacker uses program analysis tools for
de-obfuscation and code size reduction. After running our
program slicing tool, we assumed that the resulting slice size
could be considered a measure of resilience of the obfuscated
code. Our results conﬁrm our conjecture that obfuscated vari-
ant size (LoC) is not a direct measure of quality of resilience
as we found that larger size variants may be simpliﬁed by
program slicing, thus showing low resilience. Future work will
look at improving our metrics for several case studies, and
using them to search for the optimal obfuscation parameters
and conﬁgurations that maximise resilience and other code
complexity metrics.
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